š°ļø Debunked: Drones Are Not Whatās Attacking Targeted Individuals
As targeted individuals (TIs), we know how important it is to get the source of the threat right. Misinformation wastes time, money, and energy ā and it damages our credibility. One of the more persistent myths in the TI community is that drones are delivering V2K or electronic harassment.
Letās get to the truth:
ā There is no evidence that drones are behind long-term targeting
ā This claim is not supported by any RF data
ā And in most cases, what people are seeing are harmless aerial toys or hobbyist drones
š§Ŗ The Real Evidence: Far-Field RF at 1.33 GHz
Multiple high-resolution spectrum scans show the real signal of interest is:
- Far-field, not local or mobile
- Operating at 1.33 GHz, often with comb frequency structure
- Not modulating like a telemetry uplink or drone control channel
This matches:
- Military-grade surveillance tech
- Microwave-based remote influence systems
- Not short-range consumer drones with visible EM footprints
š” Weāve seen the signal ā and it doesnāt move, hover, or emit motor noise. It broadcasts.
š Why Drones Donāt Match the Threat
1. No Captured RF Evidence
People claiming drone-based targeting:
- Provide no real-time spectrum traces
- Offer no triangulated RF source scans
- Canāt show a correlation between drone activity and signal exposure
This isnāt detection ā itās assumption.
2. Itās Usually Kids, Hobbyists, or Private Aircraft
Letās be honest: most of the time, when people say āa drone is following me,ā what theyāre seeing is:
- š® Children with store-bought drones at parks or schools
- š©ļø Private airplane traffic passing overhead
- š Hobbyist pilots flying under FAA Part 107 licenses
- š Photography or real estate surveyors filming nearby rooftops
These devices:
- Have limited flight time (20ā30 minutes max)
- Operate on 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz, which is not what weāre detecting
- Have visible lights, GPS telemetry, and audible motors
The signal of interest weāre studying is consistent, stationary, and comes from outside the local vicinity ā not from some toy quadcopter.
3. The RF Power Budget Doesnāt Work
Even if someone wanted to beam V2K from a drone:
- The power-to-weight ratio would make it impractical
- Youād need a focused phased array with a military-tier power source
- It would last minutes, not hours ā and youād hear it the entire time
Thereās no tactical reason to use drones when covert, far-field RF works better ā and has no footprint.
š§ The Damage of Drone Delusions
Every time we chase the drone narrative:
- Weāre wasting energy on the wrong direction
- Weāre teaching new TIs to fear visual coincidence over electromagnetic data
- And we give skeptics and government disinfo agents an easy way to label us as paranoid
If someoneās being targeted ā prove it with a scan, not a story. If itās real, weāll see it on the spectrum.
ā What You Should Be Looking For
- A far-field carrier signal at ~1.33 GHz
- Comb frequencies spaced across the band (showing digital modulation)
- A non-local RF source, confirmed with triangulation
- Consistency over time, location, and device
This is what BB60C units, SDR spectrum logs, and filter phase analysis confirm.
Itās not a drone.
Itās directed RF from a distant source ā and it’s detectable if you use the right tools.
š§¾ Final Thoughts
What people call ādronesā are usually just kids with toys, hobby pilots, or someone filming with a GoPro.
Letās not confuse motion in the sky with proof of harassment.
If someoneās claiming drone targeting and canāt:
- Show you the frequency
- Give you the RF bandwidth
- Prove the signal’s origin
Theyāre guessing ā not proving.
Letās focus on real signals, real science, and real shielding.