🛰️ Debunked: Drones Are Not What’s Attacking Targeted Individuals

As targeted individuals (TIs), we know how important it is to get the source of the threat right. Misinformation wastes time, money, and energy — and it damages our credibility. One of the more persistent myths in the TI community is that drones are delivering V2K or electronic harassment.

Let’s get to the truth:

❌ There is no evidence that drones are behind long-term targeting
❌ This claim is not supported by any RF data
❌ And in most cases, what people are seeing are harmless aerial toys or hobbyist drones

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🧪 The Real Evidence: Far-Field RF at 1.33 GHz

Multiple high-resolution spectrum scans show the real signal of interest is:

• Far-field, not local or mobile
• Operating at 1.33 GHz, often with comb frequency structure
• Not modulating like a telemetry uplink or drone control channel

This matches:

• Military-grade surveillance tech
• Microwave-based remote influence systems
• Not short-range consumer drones with visible EM footprints

📡 We’ve seen the signal — and it doesn’t move, hover, or emit motor noise. It broadcasts.

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🚁 Why Drones Don’t Match the Threat

1. No Captured RF Evidence

People claiming drone-based targeting:

• Provide no real-time spectrum traces
• Offer no triangulated RF source scans
• Can’t show a correlation between drone activity and signal exposure

This isn’t detection — it’s assumption.

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2. It’s Usually Kids, Hobbyists, or Private Aircraft

Let’s be honest: most of the time, when people say “a drone is following me,” what they’re seeing is:

• 🎮 Children with store-bought drones at parks or schools
• 🛩️ Private airplane traffic passing overhead
• 🚁 Hobbyist pilots flying under FAA Part 107 licenses
• 🌆 Photography or real estate surveyors filming nearby rooftops

These devices:

• Have limited flight time (20–30 minutes max)
• Operate on 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz, which is not what we’re detecting
• Have visible lights, GPS telemetry, and audible motors

The signal of interest we’re studying is consistent, stationary, and comes from outside the local vicinity — not from some toy quadcopter.

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3. The RF Power Budget Doesn’t Work

Even if someone wanted to beam V2K from a drone:

• The power-to-weight ratio would make it impractical
• You’d need a focused phased array with a military-tier power source
• It would last minutes, not hours — and you’d hear it the entire time

There’s no tactical reason to use drones when covert, far-field RF works better — and has no footprint.

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🧠 The Damage of Drone Delusions

Every time we chase the drone narrative:

• We’re wasting energy on the wrong direction
• We’re teaching new TIs to fear visual coincidence over electromagnetic data
• And we give skeptics and government disinfo agents an easy way to label us as paranoid

If someone’s being targeted — prove it with a scan, not a story. If it’s real, we’ll see it on the spectrum.

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✅ What You Should Be Looking For

• A far-field carrier signal at ~1.33 GHz
• Comb frequencies spaced across the band (showing digital modulation)
• A non-local RF source, confirmed with triangulation
• Consistency over time, location, and device

This is what BB60C units, SDR spectrum logs, and filter phase analysis confirm.

It’s not a drone.
It’s directed RF from a distant source — and it’s detectable if you use the right tools.

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🧾 Final Thoughts

What people call “drones” are usually just kids with toys, hobby pilots, or someone filming with a GoPro.

Let’s not confuse motion in the sky with proof of harassment.

If someone’s claiming drone targeting and can’t:

• Show you the frequency
• Give you the RF bandwidth
• Prove the signal’s origin

They’re guessing — not proving.

Let’s focus on real signals, real science, and real shielding.